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Abstract
Diversity of practice is widely recognized as crucial to scientific progress.
If all scientists perform the same tests in their research, they might miss
important insights that other tests would yield. If all scientists adhere
to the same theories, they might fail to explore other options which, in
turn, might be superior. But the mechanisms that lead to this sort of
diversity can also generate epistemic harms when scientific communities
fail to reach swift consensus on successful theories. In this paper, we draw
on extant literature using network models to investigate diversity in sci-
ence. We evaluate different mechanisms from the modeling literature that
can promote transient diversity of practice, keeping in mind ethical and
practical constraints posed by real epistemic communities. We ask: what
are the best ways to promote the right amount of diversity of practice in
such communities?
1 Introduction
In northern Australia, locals have strategically incorporated controlled burning
in their farming practices. They do so for various reasons—to favor certain
types of vegetation to attract prey, to stimulate the growth of crops, or to
restore biodiversity (Jones, 2012; Bonta et al., 2017). A central variable in
the fire management practices—that certain species of fire-foraging raptors can
intentionally carry burning sticks to spread fire in order to flush out prey—
was widely known to local Indigenous populations through a combination of
direct observation and retelling of stories by elders (Bonta et al., 2017). But
the behaviors of these raptors remain relatively unknown to, or discounted by,
outsiders. Though many Indigenous rangers take into account the risks posed by
raptors that could cause controlled burns to jump to new locations (also known
as fire-jumping), others, including local officials, remain largely skeptical of this
piece of Indigenous Ecological Knowledge (IEK), characterizing the raptors’
behaviors as accidental or unintentional (Bonta et al., 2017). Local officials
often blame firefighters’ inexperience when a fire jumps to new locations, even
when firefighters themselves attribute the fire-jumping to the birds (Bonta et al.,
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2017, 713). Many have argued, for this reason, that incorporating and accepting
IEK within a larger scientific and regional planning community is essential to
fire management in the area (Russell-Smith et al., 2013; Bonta et al., 2017).
It has been widely argued that a diversity of practices is crucial to scientific
progress. If all scientists perform the same tests, they might miss important in-
sights that other tests would yield. If all scientists adhere to the same theories,
they might fail to explore other options which, in turn, might be superior. For
this reason, many have pointed out that it is worth promoting and preserving
a diversity of beliefs and practices within scientific communities. In the case
just discussed, IEK adds to the diversity of beliefs and practices in fire manage-
ment communities in Australia. This diversity arguably improves the success of
such communities, by introducing theories—such as those related to avian fire
spreading—that may ultimately prove very useful in fire management.
Our goal in this paper is to discuss proposals for how to go about promoting
beneficial diversity of scientific practice, drawing on extant literature. In par-
ticular, we focus on one subset of literature in philosophy of science—that using
network models to investigate the benefits of diversity in science, and exploring
mechanisms that promote such diversity. There is a wide ranging qualitative
literature on this topic with a deep history. Our contribution here focuses only
on this smaller body of work using models to think about the problem. Our
aim is to see what suggestions and proposals can be drawn from this literature,
and how they can inform our thinking about promoting diversity of practice.
Of course, this overview will be just one piece of the puzzle in thinking about
why diversity is beneficial, and considering the best ways to achieve it.
As will become clear, in this paper we focus on diversity related to the
practices of science. This sort of diversity is present when scientists vary their
activities in ways that allow for a broader exploration of scientific possibilities.
We will focus on models where actors have the options to favor different theories,
and thus to try different tests. These models consider how/when it benefits them
to do so, and what can lead them to wider or narrower exploration. Because
belief and action are tightly associated, we are also interested in diversity of the
sorts of beliefs and assumptions that, in turn, generate various practices.1 It has
been widely argued that increasing demographic/personal diversity is one way
to increase diversity of beliefs in science since those with different backgrounds
will tend to bring different beliefs, assumptions, and interests to their practice
(Haraway, 1989; Longino, 1990; Fehr, 2011). The models we discuss primarily
focus on other factors promoting diversity of practice. This said, as will become
clear, there are connections between the modeling work we discuss and work on
the importance of demographic diversity in science.
The paper will proceed as follows. In section 2 we discuss in more detail
why diversity of practice is crucial to scientific progress. In particular we dis-
cuss the idea of “transient diversity”—that a successful scientific community
will have a period of sufficient exploration to test many plausible theories and
options. In this section we present and overview a number of modeling results
1This is sometimes called cognitive diversity or epistemic diversity in science (Fehr, 2011).
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showing why transient diversity is important, and how to generate it. Section 3
considers a less popular topic of exploration—how diversity of practice can be
harmful. Ultimately some scientific practices are better than others. While it is
important to explore many possibilities, it can also be inefficient to spend too
much effort on sub-optimal theories and practices. In section 4 we present the
main contribution of the paper: an in-depth discussion of concrete proposals for
maintaining the right levels of diversity in science, keeping in mind practical and
ethical constrains. We do three main things in this section. 1) We consider how
scientific communities might mimic decision theoretic norms for exploration.
I.e., after identifying optimal levels of diversity and exploration in science we
ask: is it possible to replicate these optimal levels in real communities? 2) We
consider how we might instead incrementally improve existing scientific commu-
nities. I.e., we ask: starting from the status quo, what practical changes might
be implemented for us to ensure and gain from transient diversity in science?
And 3) we consider how mechanisms from the modeling literature for promot-
ing transient diversity might work in real communities. Which mechanisms are
most promising? Which are not likely to benefit epistemic groups? Section 5
concludes.
2 The Benefits of Transient Diversity in Science
In order for a scientific community to settle on successful and pragmatically
useful theories, the community typically must first explore some diversity of
possibilities. If not, the group may fail to ever seriously consider highly success-
ful theories and practices, and instead preemptively settle on some relatively
poor alternative. This is sometimes referred to as a period of transient diversity
in science (Zollman, 2010).
This point has been made many times in the philosophy of science. Kuhn
(1977) praises disagreement in science, pointing out that it is necessary to en-
courage exploration of rival theories. For this reason he argues that a diversity
of inductive standards is permissible. Both Kitcher (1990) and Strevens (2003)
recognize the importance of division of labor, or a focus on different problems
by different community members, in science. As they point out, if all scientists
work on the same problems important insights might be missed.2 Smaldino and
O’Connor (2021) point out that disciplinary structure in science can help pro-
tect a diversity of methods in the face of human tendencies towards conformity.
Although they argue that interdisciplinary contact is important to the spread
of good scientific methodology, they advocate for the protection of disciplinary
structure for this reason.
Recently in philosophy of science, a number of authors have used the “net-
work epistemology” paradigm to explore 1) the benefits of transient diversity
in scientific communities and 2) how such benefits might be achieved. In the
2They use models to explore how this division of labor can be promoted even when scientists
tend to agree on which problems are most promising. Both authors argue that credit incentives
might promote a diversity of approaches in science, and thus might be a good thing.
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rest of this section we will describe results from this (and related) frameworks,
which will provide a concrete starting point for further discussion.
Zollman (2007, 2010) uses network models to explore the emergence of sci-
entific consensus. The particular models he employs are drawn from the work
of Venkatesh and Goyal (1998) in economics. The models assume a network
of scientists where edges represent communicative ties. Scientists in the model
face a problem of selecting between several different action-guiding theories,
one of which will be better than the rest. In particular, the actors attempt
to solve “multi-armed bandit” problems, so named for their similarity to slot
machines (or “bandits”). Individuals may choose between different options (or
arms), i. These options have different characteristic probabilities of success, pi.
The goal is to choose the most successful option. But there is a trade-off be-
tween exploring—taking time to examine each arm carefully to learn its rate of
success—and exploiting—actually taking the most successful action and reaping
the benefits of doing do. The arms here can represent practices in science that
yield epistemic successes at different rates. For instance, the practice might
involve trying two different drug treatments on patients with liver disease, or
believing Lyme disease can or cannot exist in a chronic state and acting accord-
ingly (O’Connor and Weatherall, 2018), or acting to either explore or ignore the
dangers of smoking (Weatherall et al., 2020).
In the models presented by Zollman, actors have credences about which
option is best. They use these credences to select between arms, and upon
doing so observe the success or failure of their choice. Actors then use these
observations to update their credences, so that over time they will generally
come to learn more about the success rates of the arms. Furthermore, agents
also update their beliefs based on the actions and observations of their network
neighbors. In this way, actors can learn about actions that they themselves did
not take. Typical versions of the model assume that agents update using Bayes
rule, and thus adhere to standards of rationality when using data to change
beliefs. This process might reflect one, for example, where some scientists come
to suspect that tobacco smoking is dangerous and alter their practices to test this
theory. Over time their results might make them, and also their scientific peers,
more confident that tobacco is harmful, thus leading to further exploration of
this possibility.
In these models the social influence inherent in the network structure means
that groups tend towards consensus. Typically enough actors gather data about
the best option that the entire group eventually ends up accurately believing
that it is, indeed, best. But in many versions of these models communities can
also fail to form a good consensus. Zollman assumes that actors in the models
myopically choose whichever option they currently believe is most successful.
This might correspond to a gambler playing the bandit arm she likes best, or
a scientist generally testing the theory they find most promising, or a doctor
prescribing only the medication she thinks most efficacious. In some cases, a
string of misleading data can lead an entire community to prefer a suboptimal
option. Once the entire group focuses on this option, they stop testing other ones
and settle on a poor consensus. Zollman (2010) gives a case study exemplifying
4
this latter possibility. In the early 20th century, scientists debated whether
stomach acid or bacteria was the primary cause of peptic ulcer disease. A
highly influential study by Palmer (1954) convinced the research community
that bacteria could not live in the stomach, resulting in a consensus on the acid
theory. This research was flawed, but was only finally overturned by the work
of Warren and Marshall (1983).
We can now make clear how these models connect with other thinking on
the importance of diversity of practices in science. A community in these sorts
of models can fail if it does not spend enough time testing all the possible arms.
And given that beliefs about the arms shape which actions scientists actually
try, diversity of belief is key to ensuring diversity of practice.
Zollman (2007, 2010) focuses on the role of communication structure in pre-
serving transient diversity of beliefs. As he shows, less connected networks, i.e.,
those where fewer individuals communicate, are more likely to end up at the
correct consensus. In these less connected groups it is more likely that pockets
of diverse beliefs are preserved long enough for a good consensus to emerge.
In more tightly networked groups, misleading data is more likely to sway the
entire community to settle on a sub-optimal theory. The counter-intuitive sug-
gestion is that because transient diversity of beliefs is so important, there may
be situations where it is better for scientists to communicate poorly simply to
preserve this diversity. For example, if the work of Palmer (1954) had been
less influential, researchers unfamiliar with it might have continued to explore
bacterial causes for ulcer disease, potentially leading to quicker confirmation of
the more accurate theory.
Several other lines of investigations have found deeply similar results. One
relevant body of literature, focusing on cultural innovation and problem solving,
explores models where actors try to solve NK landscape problems. These prob-
lems involve searching a solution space with multiple “peaks” so that sometimes
actors get stuck at local optima despite the presence of better global solutions.3
March (1991) first identified NK landscapes as a good way to capture group
innovation, and showed that too much fast social learning could lead groups to
converge to local optima and fail to discover better solutions. This is analogous
to a case where a tightly connected scientific community fails to explore many
theories, and preemptively settles on one. Lazer and Friedman (2007) and Fang
et al. (2010) find that agents in less connected networks tend to find better solu-
tions to these problems (though it takes them longer). Derex and Boyd (2016)
present a cleverly designed experiment meant to test these results where teams
of six solve problems wherein they can accumulate technological advances by
building on earlier stages. The learning set-up is one where a failure to engage in
enough early exploration eliminates possibilities later on. They find that highly
connected groups, where all six members see each innovation in their group, fail
to discover the highest level technologies. Less connected groups are much more
likely to do so, as small teams explore a diversity of paths through the problem,
3This area of research connects back to early work in biology by Wright (1932) (see a
discussion in Fang et al. (2010)). As Wright pointed out, biological populations benefit from
a partially isolated subgroup structure that preserves a diversity of adaptations.
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and combine their discoveries.4
Besides social disconnection, extensions to the bandit model explore a num-
ber of other mechanisms that can also ensure a diversity of practice, and thus
improve community success. Zollman (2010) points out that intransigence or
stubbornness on the part of individual scientists can likewise preserve such di-
versity. If scientists are unwilling to revise their beliefs about the success of
various theories, this can lead individuals to keep testing a seemingly unpromis-
ing option long enough to discover its true merits. This suggestion relates to
claims by Kuhn that different inductive standards are acceptable for science. If
some scientists are “irrationally” stubborn, this might still benefit the commu-
nity since they insist on testing a diversity of possibilities rather than following
only the most promising ones.
Relatedly Gabriel and O’Connor (2021) consider models where individuals
have a tendency towards confirmation bias, i.e., where they are more likely
to engage with evidence that fits their prior beliefs. Like stubbornness, this
feature leads scientists to stick with theories longer than they would if they
were behaving in a strictly rational manner, which preserves group diversity
of beliefs and benefits the community. This suggests that perhaps a seemingly
harmful reasoning bias actually is beneficial to social learning where a diversity
of beliefs and practices can be helpful.5
Kummerfeld and Zollman (2015) show how individual tendencies towards
exploration, where scientists continue to test theories that they personally sus-
pect are suboptimal, will likewise preserve diversity of practice and improve
community performance. As they argue, though, scientists are not generally
incentivized to explore at a socially optimal level, yielding a free rider problem.
They take this as a reason that institutions such as funding bodies and award
giving agencies might play a beneficial role in promoting exploratory science.
Wu (2021b) finds a similar effect through yet another mechanism. She con-
siders situations where some dominant individuals in an epistemic community
systematically undervalue or ignore the testimony of some marginalized indi-
viduals. This might represent a case where members of one racial or ethnic
group ignore those in another, or members of one scientific discipline tend to
devalue contributions from another. This addition to the model is inspired by
Fricker (2007)’s concept of “testimonial injustice” and Dotson (2011)’s concept
of “epistemic quieting.” As Wu shows, this can lead to a surprising epistemic
advantage for those in the marginalized community, which tends to reach accu-
rate beliefs more often than communities without testimonial injustice. This is
because they update their beliefs on data from the entire network. Furthermore,
the dominant group receives less data overall, meaning they tend to spend more
time testing a wider variety of, possibly unpromising, theories. The marginal-
ized group can learn from this diversity of practice, while those ignoring their
4See also Mason et al. (2008); Jönsson et al. (2015) who yield similar findings. Mason and
Watts (2012), on the other hand, find a general disadvantage to low connectivity in problem
solving groups.
5This finding fits with informal claims from Mercier and Sperber (2017) that confirmation
bias might play a functional role in groups.
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out-group cannot.6
There is one further thing to mention about all of these models, which is that
generally factors which improve consensus on better theories in these models also
slow down the emergence of community consensus. This should make intuitive
sense. If scientists are exploring more theories long enough to really get a sense
of their merits, they will not be swiftly settling on one theory.
Altogether this body of literature strongly supports the intuitive claim that
it is indeed important to promote a transient diversity of beliefs and practices
in scientific communities. As we have seen, though, there are many factors
that might lead to this sort of diversity: reduced network connectivity, individ-
ual stubbornness (or different standards for induction), confirmation bias, the
active promotion of exploratory or risky science by funding bodies, and even
testimonial injustice.
In the next section, we will turn to discuss another side of the picture here—
the ways that transient diversity can be harmful to a scientific community. From
there we will move on to discuss how this literature should inform our thinking
about real communities.
3 The Harms of Transient Diversity in Science
The work described in the last section indicates that a transient diversity of
approaches is crucial to ensuring that scientific communities do not miss out
on promising theories. But there is a tension inherent in the promotion of this
sort of diversity. There is a cost to using suboptimal theories, paradigms, and
methods in the sciences. They are suboptimal, and thus do not embody the
current best approaches to action and investigation. This is especially clear
when it comes to areas like medicine, where incorrect beliefs can have direct
negative impacts on patients. For instance, doctors who continue to explore
the theory that “cigarettes promote health” will have direct negative health
impacts. But even in other areas adherence to a poor theory can impede progress
and create inefficiencies in science. The tension here is exacerbated by the
observation that in science there are typically limited resources. Researchers do
not have the time, money, or energy to explore multiple options indefinitely.
These observations are related to the explore/exploit trade-off inherent to
bandit problems. In order to find out about a bandit arm, you have to pull it,
and you have to pull it enough that you get a decent sample of outcomes. In
order to learn about new possibilities in science, you likewise have to test them.7
This means that to promote good learning, there must be periods of inefficiency
or poor outcomes. This raises a question for scientific communities, though:
how can a group maximize the benefits of transient diversity while minimizing
6Wu (2021b) points out that her findings support a version of standpoint epistemology,
where a disadvantaged social status can lead to epistemic advantages.
7Sometimes old tests are able to illuminate new theories as well as old ones. In the conclu-
sion we will say a bit more about the sorts of problems in science that are not well modeled
by bandit problems for this reason.
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the harms? What is the best way to ensure that promising theories are duly
tested, while avoiding the costs of using suboptimal options for too long?
Decision theory provides normative solutions when it comes to individuals
engaged in bandit problems (Gittins, 1979; Lai and Robbins, 1985; Gittins et al.,
1989; Berry and Fristedt, 1985). These solutions identify the optimal amount of
exploration to ensure actors eventually settle on the best arm, but do not waste
too much effort exploring. Although these solutions are sometimes complex, ap-
proximate solutions exist that are not hard to implement. There are a variety
of successful greedy strategies, for instance, that typically select the best option
based on past observation but with some small probability explore other options
(Sutton and Barto, 2018). Some of these strategies decrease the level of explo-
ration over time so that it starts hotter and slows down. It has been shown that
by employing these greedy strategies one can dependably learn to pick the best
option, while also spending most of the time implementing successful strategies.
We might suggest that science attempt to mimic these normative solutions.
When it comes to scientific communities, though, the issue is that they are not
run by single decision makers or even by centralized bodies. Instead individual
scientists (or collaborative groups of scientists) make decisions about what to
work on, when, and for how long, in a relatively uncoordinated way. This, of
course, is part of why we saw a number of suggestions in section 2 that appealed
to properties of individuals and communities that might promote transient di-
versity of approach without a coordinated decision maker: stubbornness, credit
motivation, low connectivity, confirmation bias, etc.
But while these sorts of solutions to the transient diversity problem can in-
deed improve final outcomes, many of them are quite inefficient when compared
to ideal approaches to bandit problems. Rosenstock et al. (2017), for instance,
further consider the sort of models presented by Zollman (2007, 2010), and show
that the benefits of decreased communication hold only in cases where the prob-
lem is especially difficult.8 (When the problem is easy, on the other hand, almost
every community successfully solves it, meaning there is no benefit to limiting
communication.) As they point out, this makes policy suggestions from Zoll-
man (2007, 2010) sound almost paradoxical. The proposal is to decrease the
flow of information in the community in exactly those situations where good
data is hard to gather. While this sort of decreased information flow does im-
prove eventual outcomes, it does so at a huge cost to efficiency—diversity is only
preserved by preventing actors from learning from useful data for a significant
length of time. As Rosenstock et al. (2017) argue, we should try to avoid this
massive inefficiency, while still exploring options for a sufficient length of time.
There is another potential downside to mechanisms that promote transient
diversity, which is that across models they also tend to lead to polarization.
When these mechanisms slow learning too far they can lead to situations where
disagreement in the community becomes stable, rather than transient. This
8This reflects findings on NK landscape models as well. In very simple landscapes, like those
with single peaks, decreased communication does not improve group success. Derex and Boyd
(2016) also find empirically that limited group communication only improves performance
when groups are faced with complex problems.
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stability of disagreement prevents the group from ever converging to a good
outcome, and leaves some individuals continuing to test poor theories. Zollman
(2010), for example, points out that when individuals are stubborn and when
group connectivity is low in his models learning becomes so slow that the com-
munity mimics one that is failing to come to consensus. Gabriel and O’Connor
(2021) point out that while moderate levels of confirmation bias increase the
chances of group success, higher levels of confirmation bias instead lead to po-
larization. Sub-groups form where individuals in each one only listen to the sets
of evidence that fit with their current beliefs. This might track a case where, for
example, one group is convinced that hydroxychloroquine is a successful COVID
treatment, and the other that it is not. Each group only considers research sup-
porting their position, thus failing to end a period of transient diversity of belief.
In the models from Wu (2021b) looking at testimonial injustice, there are cases
where marginalized groups reach accurate beliefs, but dominant groups who
ignore them continue to prefer an inaccurate theory. In such cases, there are
potential harms that could arise from the dominant group failing to ever adopt
more successful practices. Consider the example about fire-spreading raptors
that we started this paper with. Here, outsiders and local officials’ resistance
to Indigenous Ecological Knowledge arguably leads to miscalculations regarding
whether a fire is under control, thus endangering the local region with potential
catastrophes. These models all track cases where too much diversity of practice,
lasting for too long, is a bad thing.
In special situations, there are further risks to diversity of practice that arise
from industrial and political propagandists attempting to influence scientific
beliefs. Such propagandists can take advantage of doubt, uncertainty, and lack
of consensus in scientific communities to delay action against public health risks
like tobacco smoking and the use of fossil fuels (Oreskes and Conway, 2011;
O’Connor and Weatherall, 2019; Weatherall et al., 2020). For instance, tobacco
interests funded research on asbestos in order to create doubt about whether
tobacco smoke was a main cause of lung disease. Big tobacco also widely shared
legitimate, independent research arguing that smoking might be safe, again
to fuel such doubt (Oreskes and Conway, 2011). Holman and Bruner (2017)
point out that when scientists employ a diversity of methods, industry can fund
just those scientists whose findings tend to support industry interests and thus
shape epistemic progress. In all these cases, diversity of beliefs and practice
in science are weaponized to create illegitimate dissent. We can think of these
propagandists as extending the period during which less-successful practices
continue to be used beyond what is necessary to develop good beliefs. In doing
so, they increase the harms that result from transient diversity of practice.
4 Moving Forward
Given what we have seen so far, a question arises: just what are the best ways to
promote cognitive diversity in science, given our understandings of the harms,
benefits, and mechanisms of promoting transient diversity? The goal of the
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rest of this paper will be to shed some light on this question. In doing so,
we need to keep in mind a few sorts of considerations. 1) We want to promote
enough diversity to ensure good outcomes, while minimizing harms from testing
suboptimal theories. 2) We recognize that there are many facts about scientific
communities that constrain the sorts of solutions to this problem that might be
effective. And relatedly, 3) there are ethical considerations at play in thinking
about the best ways to ensure transient diversity of beliefs.
While there are many ways to structure the discussion that follows, we divide
it into three main parts. We start with optimal solutions identified in the
decision theory literature and ask: in what ways can real scientific communities
mimic these solutions? (Or not?) We then move on to ask: starting from
real scientific communities, what smaller changes might be made to promote
better levels of transient diversity? And last, we assess the usefulness of various
mechanisms to promote transient diversity introduced in section 2. We wrap
up the section by turning back to NK-landscape problems and discussing cases
where more dramatic diversity of practice might be beneficial.
4.1 Approximating Ideal Solutions
Let us start with the normative recommendations of decision theory for individ-
uals facing bandit problems. In particular, this means we will further consider
the set of greedy strategies described in the last section. In these strategies,
most of the time an individual focuses on the most promising possibility, and
then tests others with some small probability (either fixed or decreasing over
time). If a scientific community could be shaped where individuals were per-
fectly able to coordinate behavior, and perfectly able to communicate results
with each other, perhaps that community would be able to mimic these ideal
strategies. They could decide on a plan to divide the labor of investigation
either such that each scientist would test alternatives with a small probability,
or such that a small group of labs would always test less promising alternatives
and communicate their findings to the larger group. Such a community would
be guaranteed to ensure enough transient diversity of practice, while still ex-
ploiting successful practices. Notice that under this proposal cognitive diversity
is not required to promote transient diversity of practice. Instead, the necessary
diversity of practice is ensured by community agreement to do so.
Of course, as noted in the last section, this is not practical for most real
epistemic communities for a number of reasons. Most pressing is the fact that
individual scientists make their own decisions about what topics to investigate.
These decisions are driven by a wide set of factors including prior beliefs about
which theories are promising (Kuhn, 1977; Zollman, 2007), credit incentives
(Kitcher, 1990; Strevens, 2003), funding constraints, what topics are popular
among colleagues and members of the public, etc. Central coordinating bodies
cannot simply hand topics out to scientists and demand that they investigate
them. In this sort of regime coordination is difficult to achieve.
One approximation might be promoted by funding bodies, which, by se-
lecting projects to fund, rather than doling out topics, might be able to shape
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the overall exploratory tendencies of a community. In such a regime, maybe
most money is devoted to the most promising theories, but smaller pots are
systematically devoted to less promising options. Relatedly, some philosophers
have recently grappled with the importance of high-risk/high-reward science,
and have argued that funding bodies should increase funding to the the sort
of science that looks relatively unpromising at the moment, but may still yield
important discoveries (Stanford, 2019; Currie, 2019).9 Of course, this points to
another practical constraint—which is that different scientific communities work
differently, meaning that attempts to ensure the right levels of transient diver-
sity may not work the same way in each case. In particular, some disciplines
are heavily funded by one, or just a few, centralized funding sources, in which
case those sources might dole out resources in an approximately efficient way.
In other disciplines, there is little outside funding for projects, or else funding
comes from a diverse set of sources and this sort of coordination will not be
possible.
Another factor of real communities that stands in the way of matching op-
timal decision theoretic strategies has to do with constraints created by lab
structures and other aspects of science. Nersessian (2019) discusses the ways
that physical objects, as well as models and theories, constrain the practice of
science. As she points out, scientific labs innovate and change, but this inno-
vation and change is deeply shaped by the physical objects making up a lab
and the conceptual resources available to it. The next step of research for some
group is almost always constrained by current research projects. The “optimal”
model we proposed will not be practical inasmuch as labs cannot just change
gears to research entirely new topics, even if the funding is available to do so.
Again, there are differences between scientific communities here, though,
since some areas have relatively small start-up costs for switching research fo-
cus, and others relatively large. For instance, in an area of research that requires
expensive, specialized equipment, it may be highly difficult for labs to switch
projects, while for computational modelers it might be relatively easy. Mitigat-
ing this issue is the fact that in a scientific community exploratory strategies
can be distributed across a group. I.e., unlike in the decision theoretic heuris-
tics described in the last section each scientist need not continually switch from
promising to less promising research topics, as long as some small number of
scientists are strictly devoted to less promising topics. In research communities
where projects are highly constrained by resources, centralized funding bodies
might want to be especially attentive to protecting labs that continue to ex-
plore less promising theories, and which might as a result tend to lose funding.
If these labs are protected with long-term grants, or special funding measures,
diversity of practice can be maintained without requiring scientists to switch
topics.
Another difficulty arises vis a vis communication. In the decision theoretic
9Related to this are worries that there are forces in science that are inherently conservative,
i.e., that push researchers away from unpromising, unusual, or high risk research projects
(Kummerfeld and Zollman, 2015; Stanford, 2019; O’Connor, 2019). If so, then perhaps funding
bodies might need to work extra hard to promote this sort of research.
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heuristic, there is no need to communicate results, because one individual sees
them all and is able to develop accurate beliefs as a result. In real communities,
communication is often imperfect. While some labs may manage to communi-
cate their results widely, others might be unable to do so, because their research
is not of widespread interest, because of biases towards high prestige institutions,
because of differences in the communication skills of researchers, etc. In general,
it is a property of human social networks that information spreads and diffuses
at different rates and to different recipients depending on its content, and who
shares it (Vosoughi et al., 2018). Furthermore, many previous investigations
reveal that relevant information often fails to spread in scientific communities.
For instance, retractions are often cited approvingly long after they have been
retracted, even though many in the community are aware that this is no longer
appropriate (Neale et al., 2010; Cor and Sood, 2018). When these failures of
communication happen, it may be difficult for scientific communities to approx-
imate decision theoretic solutions because researchers may be unaware of which
theories and options are, in fact, the most promising ones at any particular time.
Again, this is a situation where central coordinating agencies, like grant giving
bodies, may play a key role. As long as someone is aware of all the diverse sorts
of research going on, and is able to track and synthesize this information, then
it might be possible to coordinate exploration across the community.
There is an issue, though, that goes beyond simple constraints. There is
often deep disagreement between individuals about what scientific theories are
the most promising ones. Indeed, as noted in the last section, many proposals
for promoting diversity of practice proceed by promoting diversity of belief.
But when individuals disagree about the promise of different theories, how is
exploration of the underlying space to be efficiently divided? Bandit models
assume that the process of exploration is a relatively straightforward one—
each success and failure is easily observed and straightforwardly comparable
to past successes and failures. Scientific evidence is often not like this. There
is room for substantive debate about what different evidence tells one about
the world, what theories are supported by this evidence, and what sets of data
are comparable. The point here is that even if there were a decision maker
who could efficiently allocate labor across a community, it is often impossible
to know how this decision maker ought to allocate labor given the complexities
of real scientific evidence. One way to work around this problem might involve
using lotteries to make funding decisions. Lotteries can ensure that a diversity
of projects are funded, without requiring central coordinating groups to make
hard decisions about which are most promising. We return to this idea in the
conclusion.
We also need to consider the ethical costs inherent in some proposals to
approximate the ideal decision theoretic strategies. As noted above, in some
disciplines, practical constraints might make it difficult for individual scientists
to periodically test suboptimal strategies. As a result, it might make more sense
for a small subgroup of scientists to always test suboptimal strategies. However,
this proposal might be unfair in so far as this small subgroup of scientists on
average would receive less credit. To promote the benefits of cognitive diversity
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fairly, then, it might be warranted to introduce external mechanisms to com-
pensate exploratory scientists. This relates to proposals from Stanford (2019)
and Currie (2019) about using funding and credit incentives to promote this
sort of research in the first place.10
There is another ethical worry, which relates to cases where tests themselves
cause harms. This could include environmental harms—testing nuclear bombs,
for instance, requires contaminating some area with radioactive material. One
might argue on the basis of such harms that diversity of practice is not always
worth promoting even when it might lead to important epistemic progress.
This issue arises with human subjects research such as clinical trials in
medicine. Testing unpromising therapies on humans violates a widely recog-
nized principle in research ethics called equipoise. Equipoise requires physicians
to enroll patients in a clinical trial only when they are uncertain about, or equally
poised between, the relative therapeutic merits of the treatments involved in the
trials (Fried, 1974; London, 2009). Otherwise, physicians are ethically required
to administer the better drug to the patient. This seems to be in direct conflict
with the epistemic mandate to promote diversity of exploration.
However, in actual practice equipoise comes in many different formulations.
One of its prominent formulations, clinical equipoise, interprets the uncertainty
as a lack of consensus within the scientific community about the relative merits
between treatments (Freedman, 2017; London, 2009). In a case where there is
debate about these merits, scientists that test less promising alternatives would
not be in violation of clinical equipoise. Moreover, even if the relevant formu-
lation of equipoise is a personal one, i.e. individual physicians enroll patients
in clinical trials if they are personally uncertain about the relative merits of
the treatments, we still have plenty of situations where different groups of re-
searchers genuinely prefer different experimental treatments. In such a case per-
sonal equipoise is not in conflict with the exploration of different options. That
said, personal equipoise does prevent situations where individual physicians or
researchers knowingly enroll patients in treatments that they themselves deem
unpromising. In cases where very few researchers prefer a therapy, it may not
be ethically possible to promote the ideal exploration of different possibilities.
4.2 Improving Existing Communities
To this point we have considered a set of ideal solutions to the bandit problem–
greedy strategies–and evaluated the practicalities of structuring our scientific
communities to approximate the ideal solutions. Now, we will shift our perspec-
tives a little bit to look at real epistemic communities that in many ways exhibit
non-ideal characteristics. Drawing on the modeling literature in section 2, we
10Kitcher (1990) and Strevens (2003) present models suggesting that sometimes this worry
about unfairness might not apply. In particular, they argue that credit incentives promote
cognitive division of labor (i.e., incentivize researchers to pick less promising projects) because
fewer individuals are working on these. Thus there is already a greater chance of being the
one who will get credit for discovery in less popular areas of research. However, even if credit
incentives naturally lead to a beneficial division of labor, this does not necessarily mean they
lead to the best levels of division of labor.
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instead ask: where are real scientific communities now, and how do we make
them better? I.e., what are practical, implementable changes that can improve
the status quo? In particular, we focus on realms where there are fairly clear
failures impeding scientific progress.
There is a growing empirical literature showing that even though recruit-
ment programs have brought diverse practitioners into research communities,
their expertise, testimony, and epistemic output are not always properly rec-
ognized. For instance, Settles et al. (2019) conducted interviews at a predom-
inantly white institution and found that faculty of color experience epistemic
exclusion, characterized by a devaluation of their research topics, methodolo-
gies, etc. Moreover, Deo (2019, 47) presents a study finding that most women
law professors experience “silencing, harassment, mansplaining, hepeating, and
gender bias.” Simply put, our real epistemic communities are not ones in which
everyone’s status as knowers is equally recognized and credited. Marginalized
scholars experience epistemic silencing (Dotson, 2011).
As mentioned before, Wu (2021b) finds that this kind of epistemic silencing
and exclusion can be detrimental to the community as a whole, but create
epistemic advantages for the marginalized group. In epistemic communities
with a history of epistemic silencing, then, the entire group might benefit from
measures intended to strengthen the voices of marginalized members. This is one
practical way to bring the benefits of transient diversity from one sub-group to
the larger epistemic community. Notice that this mechanism for improvement
is different from those proposed in previous work focusing on the ways that
demographic diversity can lead to diversity of practice. Background experiences
of the world resulting from personal identity can, indeed, lead to this sort of
diversity, but here we are focused on how status as member of a marginalized
group simpliciter can create epistemic advantages.
As noted, industry interests can influence science in a number of ways. For
instance, industry scientists may choose to only publish and promote scientific
research that adheres to certain goals (e.g. the Tobacco Strategy discussed in
Oreskes and Conway (2011) and Weatherall et al. (2020)). Especially relevant
here is the fact that industry scientists may not share evidence that they gather
and discoveries they make, though they may still read and learn from research
published by other scientists. Academic researchers adhere to the “communist
norm” that all research should be shared (Merton, 1942, 1979; Strevens, 2017;
Heesen, 2017). But industry research is often proprietary.
This practice of industry scientists creates conditions for transient diversity
to arise. Wu (2021a) develops models similar to her ones exploring testimonial
injustice, but where one group refuses to share, rather than one group refusing
to listen. When a small group of scientists refuses to share their evidence, but
the rest of the community follows the communist norm, the small group tends
to develop true beliefs at a higher rate. This is because the rest of the com-
munity receives less evidence on average, and thus spends more time exploring
undesirable options. The result is a transient diversity of practice that only
benefits industry scientists.
In this scenario, one might think that the benefits of transient diversity
14
that industry scientists gain are extremely unfair to the rest of the epistemic
community, especially since the mechanism (not sharing) that gives rise to the
transient diversity is in violation of a central norm that scientists are expected
to adhere to.11 It is hard to know just how this issue might be addressed. One
possibility would be to legally obligate industry to share proprietary research.
This, of course, might disincentivize industrial groups from ever performing said
research. Research is costly, and industry is often willing to pay those costs in
order to gain knowledge that others do not have. Solutions might require sharing
of research after some set period of time, or else depend on patenting to protect
industry in a way that incentivizes funding research without also keeping this
research private.
4.3 Mechanisms for Transient Diversity
We now turn to the last main part of this section: assessing the various mech-
anisms that give rise to transient diversity in network models, as surveyed in
Section 2. These models fall into two broad categories. The first offer proposals
for possible interventions that we can (or even, should) implement in epistemic
communities, in order to gain transient diversity that communities would not
otherwise have. In short, they offer policy recommendations to achieve transient
diversity. The second set of models identify possible mechanisms which might
already promote transient diversity in real communities, but do not necessarily
offer policy proposals.
This distinction is important because it will determine how we think about
these different causes for transient diversity. For models that offer policy recom-
mendations, we might want to then consider whether the proposed interventions
are actionable, practical, ethical, and whether the benefits that we would poten-
tially gain from the interventions outweigh the harms. On the other hand, for
models that address mechanisms for existing transient diversity, we might want
to instead focus on whether these mechanisms are present in target epistemic
communities, whether other factors may have interfered with the mechanism,
and whether the benefits of transient diversity are worth maintaining given po-
tential harms. Of course, some of the considerations remain the same regardless.
For instance, in both cases, we assess whether the benefits of transient diversity
are worthwhile given epistemic and ethical harms associated with it.
With this in mind, let us further discuss the models from Section 2. Both
Zollman (2007, 2010) and Kummerfeld and Zollman (2015) intend their models
to either offer solutions to the problem of (lack of) diversity or offer policy
recommendations through institutional involvement.
Kummerfeld and Zollman (2015)’s proposal of incentivizing individual sci-
entists to continue testing suboptimal theories at a small rate comes the closest
to approximating the ideal solutions in decision theory. As we have discussed
earlier, for many research communities it will not be practical for individual
11See Bright and Heesen (2021) for an argument that to be scientific is to adhere to the
communist norm.
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scientists to switch methodologies regularly. So a Kummerfeld and Zollman
(2015)-like proposal would be more implementable in some epistemic communi-
ties if we instead incentivize a small subgroup of scientists to explore suboptimal
theories, with the hope that these incentives are also strong enough to curb the
free rider problem. Barring practical constraints discussed earlier, Kummerfeld
and Zollman (2015)’s proposal may be effective at generating the benefits of
transient diversity without too much epistemic and ethical cost. In general,
their results and others suggest that there may be real benefits to grant giving
agencies that come from the diversity of practice when they focus on exploratory
research and unpopular theories.
What about Zollman (2010)’s proposal of limiting communication among
scientists? First there are some practical constraints to implementing such a
proposal. Scientists tend to want to communicate their research, and have many
venues for doing so. It is unclear how a community would go about slowing this
communication. Perhaps professional agencies could host fewer conferences,
journals could publish more slowly, grant giving agencies could cut funding for
meetings, travel and talks etc.
It is unclear whether the benefits of transient diversity under this proposal
outweigh the potential harms, but we suspect they often will not. As mentioned
in Section 3, Rosenstock et al. (2017) shows that when the learning problem
is fairly easy, the benefits of transient diversity are small. This means that
unless one is very clear about the sort of learning situation scientists are in, the
proposal in question runs the risk of slowing down learning with little benefit.
Furthermore, if communications become too limited, communities run the risk
of polarization (a la Wu (2021b)). Moreover, limiting communications among
scientists goes against the communist norm which, as noted, is a central norm
of scientific research. Given these potential harms, it seems that there are
better ways to ensure transient diversity of practice than artificially limiting
communication between scientists.
This said, there are cases where it may be worthwhile to temporarily limit
communication in order to improve discovery. To offer an example of this
(though bandit models do not perfectly apply) we think that the limited com-
munications among the four imaging teams in the Event Horizon Telescope
project may be epistemically beneficial. In this case, the four teams work in iso-
lation. They each use a different method to develop imaging algorithms, train
their algorithms against test data sets, and finally, produce their own images of
the black hole from real data collected from multiple observatories around the
world, before convening to compare images (Galison and Newman, 2021). The
four teams end up producing highly similar images while working in isolation.
Recently, sets of labs have been teaming up for “many labs” papers, which run
independent tests of the same hypothesis before combining results at the end
of the project (Ebersole et al., 2016; Klein et al., 2018). In both cases, inde-
pendent tests can help determine whether results are replicable before they are
published and begin influencing the community. Note, though, that in both of
these cases communication is limited between groups who are interested in the
same theories, but who want to preserve diversity in their tests. The benefits of
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limited communication here are related to, but somewhat different from, those
identified using bandit models.
What about the other mechanisms that lead to transient diveristy, such as
testimonial injustice (Wu, 2021b) and confirmation bias (Gabriel and O’Connor,
2021)? In both cases we have pretty good reasons to believe that these factors
are widely present in many epistemic communities. Also, in both cases these
mechanisms seem to be poor candidates for policy recommendations, since few
individual scientists would want to knowingly commit injustices or engage in
reasoning biases.12 Our question now is: are the benefits of transient diversity
worthwhile to keep in these cases? Of course, there may be no choice, since
these factors depend on deep facts about human psychology, but we take it to
be worthwhile, nonetheless, to discuss whether or not attempts to eliminate (or
preserve) them are right headed.
The answer seem clear in the case of testimonial injustice. The benefits of
transient diversity come with a number of epistemic and ethical harms. Epis-
temic injustice directly harms individuals as knowers and community members.
Relatedly, for marginalized groups, although they may garner epistemic ad-
vantages in the sense of learning true beliefs more often and faster, they may
not receive credit proportional to their epistemic achievements (Rubin, 2021).
This is because the epistemic achievements possessed by the marginalized group
may not be acknowledged and recognized by the wider epistemic community.
Lastly, this mechanism may lead to polarization in the epistemic community,
where the marginalized and dominant groups stably converge to different the-
ories. Polarization often is associated with community dysfunction. Epistemic
injustice, polarization, and credit deficit are all significant harms that outweigh
any benefits of transient diversity in this case.
That said, as with any kind of systemic oppression, we should not expect
testimonial injustice to go away easily in a short period of time, even with
active efforts to decrease it. As a result, in many epistemic communities, we
may continue to see subgroups of marginalized individuals with certain epistemic
advantages. In cases like these, the rest of the epistemic community may have
opportunities to gain epistemic insights from these groups. The suggestion
here is to implement interventions designed at reducing testimonial injustice to
improve the flow of ideas that have already benefited from transient diversity
of practice.
The case with confirmation bias is considerably different. To start, while
the tendency to update on evidence that confirms one’s preferred theory may
violate some norms of good inquiry, it does not seem to commit glaring injus-
tice to others. Moreover, as discussed, low levels of confirmation bias facilitate
the discovery of true belief by slowing down the community learning process.
Given this, we think that in some cases, confirmation bias may bring surprising
epistemic benefits. On this picture, active attempts to increase informational
literacy by decreasing confirmation bias may sometimes have negative effects.
12Not to mention that in the case of testimonial injustice, the agents committing testimonial
injustice learn worse on average in terms of accuracy and speed (Wu, 2021b).
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This said, it seems risky to actually attempt to promote confirmation bias (or
other, similar forms of irrational stubbornness) in science. There are real his-
torical cases where scientific communities have polarized over matters of fact,
to the apparent detriment of inquiry. O’Connor and Weatherall (2018) give a
case study regarding chronic Lyme disease where this sort of polarization has
arguably harmed a wide swathe of patients. And in any case, it is difficult
to intervene on deep seated psychological biases. For these reasons, this does
not seem the best lever for promoting beneficial levels of transient diversity in
science.
4.4 Complex Problems and Transient Diversity
We have now concluded the main discussion of the paper, but want to address a
serious limitation before concluding. To this point, we have relied heavily on the
multi-armed bandit model of scientific exploration, both in outlining the benefits
and harms of transient diversity, and also in assessing various mechanisms for
promoting transient diversity. But, as noted in previous sections, this is not the
only model of scientific exploration. And when we consider other models, this
shifts the analysis. Of particular interest here are the NK-landscape models
briefly described in section 2. As noted, in this sort of complicated problem
space optimal solutions may not be easily accessible from all starting places.
And, in particular, there are often local optima such that individuals who reach
them must then explore less successful options before they can discover global
optima.
There are many areas of science with similar structures, i.e., where adopting
the best theory/option at one point in inquiry closes off other pathways that
might lead to better options later. In such cases a much more radical level
of exploration and diversity is merited than would be appropriate for bandit-
model-type scientific problems. The mandate is no longer to explore apparently
suboptimal options because they themselves might, in fact, be better than pre-
viously thought. The mandate is to keep exploring these options, even when it
is clear that they are, indeed, suboptimal, because it is possible that they will
lead to other, important discoveries.
Alternatively, there are simpler problems that demand less transient diver-
sity. Bandit models generally assume that arms are independent, and thus that
learning about one does not yield information about the others. In science,
though, theories are often interrelated so that tests of topic A also inform topic
B. In an extreme case, we can imagine situations where there are tests which can
decide between two competing theories. If so, or if scientists face a particularly
easy bandit problem, transient diversity of practice might not be particularly
important (Rosenstock et al., 2017).
We might ask: is there some sort of way to know what the problem space
of a scientific discipline looks like? If so, then maybe the goal could be to
promote a more modest level of diversity in those areas where bandit-problems
and similar models apply, and more radical diversity of practice in those areas
where NK-landscape models apply. This does not strike us as a promising plan,
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though. In many cases, if some topic is on the cutting edge of scientific research,
its structure, as a problem, is not well understood. Even problems that seem
almost tailored to bandit models may have more complex structures. Take an
example used by Zollman (2010). Suppose there is a well-understood drug A,
and a new, experimental drug B. The goal is to figure out which drug has more
efficacy for some condition. Tests, here, involve prescribing the two drugs and
seeing how patients react. This is well-modeled by a bandit problem. Suppose
that B turns out to be the worse option, and physicians begin to stop prescribing
and studying it. But also suppose that B, when combined with some different
therapy C, is tremendously beneficial. A problem that looked like a bandit
problem thus turns out to be more complex.
This complicates recommendations for scientific communities tremendously.
It may mean that the level and persistence of transient diversity necessary to
ensure good epistemic progress is more dramatic than previously imagined. It
also might mean that the explore/exploit trade-off inherent to transient diversity
of practice is more serious. This raises questions such as: is it acceptable to
keep using clearly unpromising medical therapies on the chance that they will
generate future discoveries? Equipoise mandates reduced diversity of practice,
despite its epistemic benefits, because what matters to human wellness is success
right now.
This observation about NK-landscapes relates to another complaint one
might make about using bandit models in this investigation. Typical models of
transient diversity that employ bandits assume a well-defined, well-understood
set of options for explorations. I.e., scientists can try A or B (or C or D). But
the model does not include the generation of new theories. The landscape model
does a better job of representing this process, as it often involves actors search-
ing a space to look for new theoretical possibilities. Some of these investigations
have suggested that cognitive diversity is important in that it might prompt in-
dividuals to test different theories, and explore different areas of theory-space
(Thoma, 2015; Pöyhönen, 2017).13 This claim complements arguments men-
tioned earlier from feminist philosophy of science, standpoint epistemology, and
science studies that cognitive diversity is important in shaping choices of re-
search questions and hypotheses generated (Okruhlik, 1994; Haraway, 2013).
This is all to say that there is a different and important sort of diversity
of thought/practice from what we have been focusing on. Bandit models help
us ask: what is the optimal distribution of investigation over a set of possi-
bilities? But we also want to ask: how do we encourage diversity of thought
and diversity of practice that leads to the exploration of new and unexpected
possibilities? In this latter vein, proposals about diversifying the demographics
of scientific communities seem promising. The idea is that demographically di-
verse community members may entertain a wide set of hypotheses, have different
background assumptions, and use different inferential standards and practices.
For instance, in the avian fire-spreading example we started with, local Indige-
13See also Weisberg and Muldoon (2009), though their original modeling work has been con-
vincingly criticized by a number of authors (Thoma, 2015; Alexander et al., 2015; Pöyhönen,
2017; Pinto and Pinto, 2018).
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nous residents are able to uncover a novel variable in fire management, due
in large part to their intimate relationships with local environment and their
unique generational knowledge keeping practices. Furthermore, the observa-
tions in this section lend further support to the proposal that funding sources,
and publication venues, should actively try to promote at least some level of
unusual, exploratory, and unpopular topics of investigation.
5 Conclusion
Several promising pathways have emerged from the discussion here. First, cen-
tralized bodies are important to coordinate research across a community and
support exploratory research in particular. Second, promoting diverse voices is a
relatively low-cost, low-risk way to increase exploration across topics in science
and to improve benefits from transient diversity of practice. Third, network
models may provide guides as to where to locate benefits of transient diversity
in existing epistemic communities, e.g. marginalized subgroups and proprietary
industry scientists.
With regards to the first proposal there has been increasing support of mod-
ified lottery funding in science. Reviewers tend to be drawn to proposals that
are highly promising, safe, and familiar. This means that risky, exploratory,
unusual, and unpopular topics tend to be rejected. A lottery ensures that at
least some topics which seem less promising in the short term still receive fund-
ing. Typical proposals along these lines first reject grant applications that are
clearly below the bar, maybe accept the most exceptional proposals, and then
use a lottery to determine further funding. There is a further benefit to using
lotteries, which arises in cases where there is genuine confusion and disagree-
ment about how promising some theories are compared to others. As noted,
this kind of disagreement is common in epistemic communities. It also compli-
cates attempts by funding bodies to ensure ideal levels of exploratory research.
Although lotteries cannot ensure ideal levels either, they do provide a way to
increase diversity of practice even when different stakeholders in a community
disagree about what this sort of diversity should look like.
In this paper, we have discussed a number of proposals and possibilities
for ensuring a good level of transient diversity of practice in science, drawing
on recent modeling work. Scientific communities, and scientific problems, are
complex. This means that our discussion is necessarily tentative. Though the
models we discussed may not apply to all scientific communities, our hope is to
draw readers to this small body of literature that may inform and complement
the larger discussion on social and cognitive diversity in science.
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